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PRESCRIPTION
Lee Hargrave*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Act 854 of 1960 (La. R.S. 9:5682) provides that an action by an
heir or legatee who has not been recognized in a judgment of posses-
sion, against a third person who has acquired the property from or
through a person recognized as an heir or legatee of the deceased in
the judgment of possession "is prescribed in ten years if the third
person or his ancestors in title, singly or collectively, have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public and unequivocal
possession of the property for such period after the registry of the
judgment of possession .... "
The prescription established by the statute is acquisitive.' In
Trahan v. Broussard2 the Louisiana supreme court held that the stat-
ute did not require the third person in possession be in good faith-a
result which was not mandated by the ambiguous statutory language,
was inconsistent with the traditional code requirements of good faith
for the shorter ten year prescription, and has been criticized as facili-
tating fraud.3 All-State Credit Plan Natchitoches Inc. v. RatclifJ'
reverses that aspect of Trahan and holds the statute requires posses-
sion in good faith.
Though the statute is ambiguous on the point, its reference to
"the third person or his ancestors in title, singly or collectively" being
in possession seems to allow a third person to tack onto the time of
possession of the heir or legatee from whom he acquires, although the
latter cannot himself prescribe. One might argue that the possession
of the heir is excluded, but that analysis would put the third person
in the same position as under the law existing before the statute,'
thus rendering the statute inoperative. Consistent with this reason-
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. "Inasmuch as a period of possession is required, the prescription is acquisitive
rather than liberative in nature." Pascal, Civil Code and Related Subject Matter, 21
LA. L. REv. 53, 64 (1960). See Trahan v. Broussard, 251 La. 714, 206 So. 2d 82 (1968);
Note, 42 TuL. L. REV. 219 (1967).
2. 251 La. 714, 206 So. 2d 82 (1968).
3. Id. at 87 (Sanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Trahan v.
Broussard, 196 So. 2d 858, 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (Tate, J., dissenting); Pascal,
Civil Code and Related Subject Matter, 21 LA. L. REV. 53, 64 (1960); Note, 14 LOYOLA
L. REv. 429 (1967-68); cf. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-
1967 Term-Prescription, 28 LA. L. REv. 346, 352 (1968).
4. 279 So. 2d 660 (La. 1973).
5. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3478.
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ing, the court in RatclifJ indicates that such tacking is permissible.'
Since the statute is construed in pari materia with the Civil Code
to reach the conclusion that good faith possession is required, it is
consistent to apply the traditional Civil Code tacking principles, in-
cluding the rule that one in good faith cannot tack onto his ancestor's
bad faith possession for purposes of ten year prescription.! In the
instant case, since the heir named in the judgment of possession was
in bad faith, the third possessor in good faith could not tack onto the
heir's time of possession. If the heir had been in good faith, though
he himself could not prescribe, the third person, it appears, could
tack onto his possession in accruing the ten year good faith prescrip-
tion of the statute.
Under Louisiana's tacking theory, it is arguable that a possessor
in bad faith acquiring from a possessor in good faith can tack onto
the ancestor's good faith possession and acquire by ten year prescrip-
tion.' The rule rests partly on the conceptions, (1) that the first pos-
sessor is transferring all of his inchoate prescriptive rights to the
second possessor, and (2) that the possessor in good faith could well
have prescribed himself by continuing in possession, so that a trans-
fer to another does not seriously worsen the position of the real owner.
However, in light of those policy bases the traditional rule may be
inapplicable to tacking under the 1960 statute. The heir could not
take advantage of the statute's prescription, even if in good faith, and
thus has no inchoate prescriptive rights to transfer. Moreover, no
matter how long the heir continues in possession, the statute would
not allow him to acquire. Thus, to permit his transferree to do so
would substantially prejudice the true owner. Further, it may be that
the real owner in a close family situation, such as is likely to arise
under the statute, might be less likely to have demanded his rights
against the ancestor of the third possessor than in the normal non-
succession prescription situation. In light of these considerations, it
is best not to allow the bad faith third possessor to tack onto the heir's
good faith possession. A further problem arises if a third possessor in
bad faith desires to tack onto the heir's bad faith time of possession
to establish 30-year bad faith prescription. Since the statute refers
only to ten year prescription, and is not ambiguious on the point,
6. 279 So. 2d at 667. But see id. (Summers, J., dissenting).
7. 2 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS no. 313 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) in 2 CIVIL
LAW TRANSLATIONS at 365 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966) [hereinafter cited as AUBRY &
RAU]; Comment, 8 LA. L. REv. 105, 110 (1947).
8. Devall v. Choppin, 15 La. 566 (1840); Liuzza v. Heirs of Nunzio, 241 So. 2d 277
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1970). The rule is subject to criticism. See AUBRY & RAu 365-66 n.40;
Comment, 8 LA. L. REV. 105, 111 (1947).
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there seems to be no room to construe the statute as also creating a
30-year bad faith prescription. As construed, the statute protects
good faith, leaving the bad faith possessor to begin his own prescrip-
tive period from the time he begins possession.
Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux9 continues the view of the jurisprud-
ence that the moral good faith of a possessor, at least of one ac-
quainted with the relevant family history involved, is insufficient for
good faith prescription if he was under an error of law or had "notice
of facts which ought to excite inquiry and which if pursued would lead
to knowledge of other facts""0 that would disclose a defect in title. It
would seem that the underlying breadth represented by the presump-
tion of good faith of Civil Code article 3481 and the simple definition
of a good faith possessor in article 3451 as one with "just reason to
believe himself the master of the thing which he possesses" ought to
prevail over the jurisprudential rule. Such a construction is supported
by the statement of Aubry and Rau that, "an acquirer who made an
erroneous judgment about the value of the documents produced by
his grantor could rely on this error in justifying his good faith, even
if he committed an error of law."" This is so even in light of the
interpretation given to article 1846 providing that an error of law can
not be a means of prescribing, for "[a]ll that article purports to
regulate is the rights of parties to a contract. The judicial construc-
tion of paragraph 3 causes that paragraph to become a rule about
acquisitive prescription in terms of the rights of record owners rather
than a rule about acquisitive prescription in terms of the rights of
parties in privity."' 2
The 30-year boundary prescription of article 852 was invoked in
Winch v. Veazey,' 3 but the court rejected the claim on the ground
that "there was no visible boundary line between the lands possessed
by the parties."' 4 The factual finding is supported by evidence that
the claimed visible boundary-a line where a ridge stopped and
marsh began-was in fact an area 40 to 200 feet wide, depending on
weather conditions, and that the area of growth of marsh grass that
might have evidenced the line was not unchanging. On other facts,
however, a definite natural boundry ought to be sufficient. Artificial
boundaries or monuments are not required, as article 826 provides
9. 282 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 851.
11. AUBRY & RAU 364.
12. Comment, 28 LA. L. Rav. 662, 667 (1968).
13. 282 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 783.
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that a boundary is "every separation, natural or artificial, which
marks the confines or line of division of two contiguous estates. '"'
15. LA. Civ. CODE art. 826 (emphasis added).
